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Who Defaults on their Home Mortgage?
Eric Doviak∗ Sean MacDonald†
ABSTRACT
Since Feb. 13, 2010, detailed information on every home mortgage default and foreclosure in New York State
must be filed with the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS). The data come from pre-foreclosure
filing (PFF) notices that mortgage servicers must send to both the borrower and the DFS 90 days prior to initiating
the foreclosure process and when a foreclosure has commenced. Pairing the PFF data with data on originations
from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) reveals the race and ethnicity of borrowers who defaulted on their
home mortgages. HMDA analyses consistently reveal strong racial and ethnic disparities in lending practices. Our
analysis shows that the same disparities reappear in the default data (i.e the PFF data), which suggests that lending
disparities contributed to the higher default rates that we observe among black and Latino borrowers. Our analysis
also suggests that labor market recovery would do the most to reduce the rate of mortgage default.
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2006, borrowers’ inability to repay subprime mortgages sounded the first warning bell that the nation’s
housing bubble was about to burst. Subprime lending – which was virtually non-existent at the peak of
the previous real estate boom in 1989-90 – had increased from 5 percent of total mortgage originations in
1994 to almost 20 percent in 2005 (Doms et al., 2007). More disturbingly, at the beginning of the decade,
the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (2000a) had already identified a pattern of racial
and ethnic disparities in subprime lending and noted that the pattern transcended income level.
By the time markets tumbled in 2008, the racial and ethnic character of subprime lending ensured that
minority borrowers would be particularly hard hit by the accelerating foreclosure crisis. To shed more light
on the causes of the foreclosure crisis and its impact on minority borrowers, this article takes a closer
look the factors affecting a homeowner’s probability of default. Specifically, we look at defaults among
owner-occupied, first-lien mortgages originated between 2004 and 2008 (the period when the most risky
loans were originated).
To study the causes of default, we combine data on originations from the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act originations (HMDA) to the pre-foreclosure filing (PFF) data from the New York State Department of
∗Brooklyn College, City University of New York – eric@doviak.net
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75
FALL 2012
Financial Services (DFS), formerly known as the New York State Banking Department (NYSBD)1,2, and
trace loans from origination to default.
The HMDA data are particularly valuable because their geographic focus enables state bank regu-
lators (like the DFS) to track institutions’ lending neighborhood-by-neighborhood. When combined with
other sources of information (e.g. reports from bank examinations), the HMDA data help bank regulators
explore the question of whether local financial institutions are meeting the saving, borrowing and housing
needs of low-to-moderate income communities and minority communities.
Academics frequently shun the HMDA data however because the data do not provide a detailed
picture of each loan application. The HMDA data do contain borrower’s income, loan amount and a small
window on the interest rate, but critical details like the borrower’s credit score and loan-to-value ratio are
missing.
In defense of the HMDA data, we argue that they are a very important data source because they are
the most comprehensive and it’s the data source that the US Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment had used in its (previously mentioned) research on racial and ethnic disparities in subprime lending.
In his 2007 Report to the Interagency Task Force on Subprime Mortgages, NYS Banking Superintendent
Neiman declared that “analysis of HMDA data is a priority” because the HMDA data is publicly available
and because it is the data that regulators use to track lending neighborhood-by-neighborhood.
One year later, the task force was promoted to a governor’s level task force and issued a follow-up re-
port (Neiman, 2008) detailing its analysis of data from the Mortgage Bankers Association, the LoanPerfor-
mance Data, the HMDA data and the RealtyTrac data. The report noted a sharp increase in foreclosures
since 2005, noted the racial disparities in lending practices, noted that subprime loans constituted almost
half of serious delinquencies and noted that subprime loans with adjustable interest rates were seriously
delinquent at rates far above the average for all loans (22 percent vs. 3 percent in New York State).
In the same report, Neiman also cited the State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group (2008) findings
that seven out of ten seriously delinquent borrowers were not on track for any loss-mitigation outcome, that
loss-mitigation departments were severely over-worked and – critically – that loss mitigation procedures
(when followed) do increase the chances that homeowners will receive a loan modification.
Given these findings and upon Neiman’s recommendation, the New York State legislature passed
and Gov. David Paterson signed (on Dec. 15, 2009) the Mortgage Foreclosure Law which amended
the Real Property Actions and Proceedings and inserted a new section (§ 1306) to require mortgage
servicers to send borrowers a 90-day notice prior to commencing foreclosure proceedings on owner-
occupied residential mortgages.
Additionally, the new law required mortgage servicers to electronically submit the pre-foreclosure
filings (PFF) to the NYSBD (later DFS) for the purpose of putting borrowers in touch with non-profit mort-
gage counselors and “to perform an analysis of loan types which were the subject of a pre-foreclosure
notice.” The language in § 1306 does not permit state bank regulators to sanction a lender or mort-
gage servicer for infractions discovered in the PFF filings. Enforcement of the law is left to the courts.
Consequently, servicers have a strong incentive to submit honest and accurate filings.
When deciding what information about the loans to collect from the mortgage servicers, the NYSBD
chose to collect information that would help it match the pre-foreclosure filings to the corresponding HMDA
filings. Furthermore, in its two reports analyzing the PFF data (2010a; 2010b), the NYSBD compared the
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PFF data to the HMDA data to estimate the mortgage default rate by county and to compare mortgage
default rates by loan amount.
Because the PFF data were designed to be matched to the HMDA data and given HMDA’s historic
and regulatory importance, this article continues the tradition of HMDA analysis by merging the PFF data
into the HMDA data and asking what characteristics make a borrower more likely to default on his/her
home mortgage.
We begin by discussing the literature on discrimination in mortgage lending in section 2. We then
describe the PFF data in more detail and explain how we paired it with the HMDA data in section 3.
Section 4 discusses the racial and ethnic disparities that we observe in the HMDA data (on originations)
and the HMDA data (on defaults). The analysis there shows that blacks and Latinos tend to take high-cost
loans at a higher rate than their white and non-Latino counterparts and those disparities in lending are
reflected in the higher default rates among black and Latino borrowers.
Section 5 provides a basic regression analysis to further explore some of the questions that arise in
the PFF to HMDA comparisons. Missing variables hinder efforts to properly understand what we observe
in the HMDA data, but the estimated coefficients on race and ethnicity are striking. Our models also
suggest that labor market conditions have the strongest effect on a borrower’s probability of default.
2 REVIEW OF THE DISCRIMINATION LITERATURE
Although there is a link between lending disparities and the foreclosure crisis, we must separate the two
events in time. To that end, this section will first review the literature on subprime lending in predominantly
black and Latino communities before turning to its relationship with the subsequent foreclosure crisis.
That having been said, several studies of the foreclosure crisis did look for its roots in the residential
segregation seen in many of the nation’s metropolitan areas (Rugh and Massey, 2010) and the lack of
alternatives to subprime lenders in predominantly minority communities (US Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 2000b). However, other factors also played a role. Doms et al. (2007) include
changes in home prices and home price volatility among its causes, while Morgan et al. (2012) discuss
the inability to exclude the mortgage on a primary residence from bankruptcy protection after passage of
the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act.
Returning to the character of lending in black and Latino communities, we remind the reader that
the HMDA data are limited. Analysis of the HMDA data strongly suggests that blacks and Latinos had
difficulty obtaining loans on terms comparable to their white and non-Latino counterparts, but because
the HMDA data omit important variables (such as the borrower’s credit score and the loan-to-value ratio)
one cannot prove a pattern of discrimination. In other words, it is easy to show that high-cost lending was
most prevalent in predominantly minority communities, but it is difficult to take the next step and use the
HMDA data to show that such lending is evidence of discrimination.
In an effort to overcome some of HMDA’s limitations, Bocian et al. (2006) paired the 2004 HMDA data
with a proprietary dataset of 177,000 subprime loans and found that after controlling for other factors (such
as the borrower’s FICO score and the loan-to-value ratio), blacks and Latinos received a disproportionate
share of high-cost loans. The major limitation of their study however is that it does not sample from the
universe of originations. It is a particular firm’s sample of loans. The findings may suffer from selection bias
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and are certainly not generalizable to the broader market. More importantly, Bocian et al.’s work cannot
be considered evidence of discrimination because it does not explain why borrowers took a subprime loan
as opposed to a prime loan.
When employing the HMDA data to study the broader market researchers are generally confined to
finding a correlation between racial segregation and the probability of receiving a high-cost loan. For
example, Squires et al. (2009) use the 2000 Census data to construct a dissimilarity index to obtain
a measure of the ten most segregated and the ten least segregated metropolitan areas in the US. They
then compare the indices derived to the percentage of high-cost loans originated. Using 2006 HMDA data
and the 2006 American Community Survey, they employ a multivariate OLS model (to control for several
MSA-level variables) and find that racial segregation is a significant predictor of the percentage of high-
cost loan originations in an MSA. Their results suggest that a 10 percent increase in black segregation
was associated with a 1.4 percent increase in high-cost loans.
Other studies have also found a link between the racial composition of a neighborhood and the share
of subprime lending in that neighborhood. For example, in a joint study conducted by several community
organizations, Bromley et al. (2008) focused on subprime lending activity in 2006 across seven large
US metropolitan areas. Data collected on the number of high-risk loans originated by a sample of 35
subprime lenders during that year indicated that these lenders accounted for an estimated 20 percent of
the market share of subprime loans in predominantly minority neighborhoods within these metropolitan
areas. Further, more than 40 percent of the loans made by high-risk lenders in these metropolitan areas
were in neighborhoods where the share of minority residents was 80 percent or more. Subprime lenders’
market share was also positively correlated with a census tract’s share of minority residents.
The US Department of Housing and Urban Development (2000b) also found a disproportionate con-
centration of subprime lending in predominantly minority – and particularly – African-American commu-
nities. In the study, which focuses primarily on subprime refinance lending, the number of subprime
refinance loans originated in the New York metropolitan area between 1993 and 1998 increased by
an estimated 350 percent. The study also found that subprime loans were three times more likely to
be originated in lower-income neighborhoods in the New York metropolitan area than in higher-income
neighborhoods, and more than four times more likely in predominantly black than in predominantly white
neighborhoods.
It’s particularly interesting to note that their study was published in 2000, which indicates that subprime
lending expanded rapidly into minority communities long before the subprime mortgage meltdown began
in 2006. According to Laderman (2001), one factor which contributed to the expansion of subprime
mortgage lending in the early 1990s was the increasing frequency with which mortgages were securitized.
Securitization reduced the risk associated with lending to subprime borrowers and it enabled large sums to
be assembled for the purpose of subprime lending. Another factor that Laderman cites was deregulation.
Prior to passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980, limits were
imposed on the interest rates that lenders could charge. Once the caps were lifted, lenders could raise
interest rates high enough to absorb the risk associated with lending to subprime borrowers.
In a separate but related report, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (2000a)
found that the pattern of originating subprime loans to minorities transcended income level and that this
pattern established itself long before the subprime loan market reached its peak during the early 2000s.
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Instead, borrowers in high-income black neighborhoods were twice as likely as those in low-income white
neighborhoods to take out a subprime loan. Specifically, the study found that just six percent of borrowers
in high-income white neighborhoods had subprime loans while 39 percent of borrowers in upper-income
black neighborhoods had subprime loans. This figure was more than twice the 18 percent rate for bor-
rowers in low-income white neighborhoods.
Such findings are disturbing. The lack of information on credit scores in the HMDA data may explain
some of the disparities in the rate spreads among individual borrowers, but it is hard to see how this could
be applicable across neighborhoods. In other words, it is easy to imagine individual cases where a high-
income black borrower’s credit score is lower than a low-income white borrower’s credit score; however it
is difficult to see how the average credit score of a high-income black neighborhood could be lower than
the average credit score of a low-income white neighborhood.
Given that blacks and Latinos took a disproportionately high share of subprime loans, one would also
expect a disproportionately high rate of foreclosure in black and Latino communities. This is precisely
what two other studies have found.
Rugh and Massey (2010) attempt to link the correlation between high-cost lending and the patterns
of residential segregation to the subprime foreclosure crisis. To find the link, they obtained the total
number of foreclosures between 2006 and 2008 from RealtyTrac’s foreclosure database and computed the
foreclosure rate as the number of filings per household unit. They then used the 2004-2006 HMDA data
to compute the share of high-cost loans3 in each MSA. To derive a measure of regulatory oversight, they
also computed the share of loans within the MSAs that were originated by institutions covered under the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Rugh and Massey then regress the number and rate of foreclosures
in the nation’s 100 largest MSAs on two measures of segregation: residential unevenness and spatial
isolation. Their regression results suggest that residential segregation and the share of high-cost loans
are both positively correlated with the number and rate of foreclosures across U.S. metropolitan areas.
One frustrating omission in their published paper however is the lack of a regression of the high-cost
lending share on measures of racial and ethnic segregation. If segregation enabled lenders to target
minorities for high-cost loans (as Rugh and Massey claim), then they should have regressed the high-cost
lending share on measures of segregation. If the coefficient were positive and statistically significant, then
their claims of racial and ethnic targeting would have a firmer foundation.
Gerardi and Willen (2008) also examine the relationship between foreclosures and subprime lending
in urban and minority communities. By matching the 1998-2006 HMDA data to deed registry data in the
State of Massachusetts, they generate a dataset that contains the universe of mortgages, foreclosures,
purchases and sales. In their analysis of the data, they find that a disproportionate share of subprime
loans were originated to blacks and Latinos, but these loans proved unsustainable when home prices
fell. The records of property sales in their dataset indicate that a “sudden and severe fall in the share
of minority home ownership” began in 2005 due to a significant increase in foreclosures among minority
homeowners.
The studies reviewed above show that blacks and Latinos took a disproportionately high share of high-
cost and subprime loans, but the evidence that this trend reflects discrimination suffers from the limitations
of the HMDA data. Nonetheless, the studies do help explain our finding that blacks and Latinos defaulted
on their mortgages at a higher rate than their white and non-Latino counterparts.
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3 THE NEW YORK STATE PRE-FORECLOSURE FILING DATA
As mentioned previously, our findings come from an analysis of the data that the NYSBD began collecting
home mortgage defaults in Feb. 2010. (The DFS later assumed those responsibilities). When borrowers
default on their primary residence, their mortgage servicers must send them a pre-foreclosure notice at
least 90 days before commencing foreclosure proceedings and file the notice with the DFS.
The DFS collects an extraordinary level of detail on the loans. In addition to names and address, the
DFS also collects the current monthly payment, the delinquent contractual payments, the interest rate,
whether the loan is a fixed-rate or adjustable-rate mortgage, the date and the amount of the original loan,
the lien type, the loan term, whether the loan has been modified or not and whether an investor’s approval
is necessary to modify the loan. If the default progresses to a lis pendens filing (i.e. the first step in the
foreclosure process – the filing of the complaint), then servicers are also required to follow up on their
initial filing and provide information on the entity filing for foreclosure.
The New York State Banking Department (2010a,b) provided basic analysis of the PFF data. In
another paper (Doviak and MacDonald, 2011), we compare the characteristics of loans that did and did
not progress from default to a foreclosure filing. The analysis presented in this article uses our combined
HMDA-PFF dataset to examine the loan characteristics which make a borrower more likely to default.
Prior to making such comparisons however, we first explain how we prepared the PFF dataset for
statistical analysis in subsection 3.1. Then, in subsection 3.2, we explain how we matched the PFF data
to the HMDA data. After providing those explanations, we discuss our comparisons in section 4 and we
provide a very basic regression analysis in section 5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of what we
learned from the pre-foreclosure filing project.
3.1 PREPARING THE DATA FOR ANALYSIS
One of our first steps in preparing the dataset was to remove duplicate filings. Servicers who missed the
three-business day deadline or submitted incorrect information would “re-file” the loan. Some servicers
also submitted one filing for each borrower on the loan. The duplicates were fairly easy to identify however,
because servicers almost always included their loan numbers with the filing, so the combination of the
servicer’s identity and the loan number enabled us to uniquely identify each loan4. In cases where a
servicer submitted one filing for each borrower, we compared the borrower’s first and last name to the
names of other borrowers on the loan to see if there was a co-applicant or not.
Because servicers re-filed a loan to correct mistakes, we assumed that the filing which was submitted
last contained the correct information. However if one of the duplicates contained information on a lis
pendens filing, we retained that information. Using this method, we found a total of 214,705 unique loans
and 33,859 duplicates in the PFF dataset. From there, we removed records that contained obvious errors
(e.g. loans that were originated in the future) and records of 90-day letters that were not mailed in the
year 2010. This reduced the PFF dataset to 211,962 clean records.
To ensure comparability across loans, we chose to focus on first-lien mortgages. This reduced the
PFF dataset to 186,366 records, but it was a necessary step because a first-lien mortgage is very different
from a home equity line of credit (HELOC). The former is frequently taken for the purpose of purchasing
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Table 1: Distribution of Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Year of Origination
year total percent
1976-1989 2,502 1.3%
1990-1999 13,692 7.3%
2000 2,414 1.3%
2001 4,390 2.4%
2002 7,470 4.0%
2003 16,706 9.0%
2004 18,669 10.0%
2005 28,506 15.3%
2006 35,947 19.3%
2007 31,771 17.0%
2008 16,019 8.6%
2009 6,957 3.7%
2010 1,323 0.7%
total 186,366 100.0%
Data: Full PFF
a home, while the latter is often used for home improvement.
Our analysis pays particular attention to the 130,912 first-lien mortgages that were originated in the
years 2004-2008. Table 1 shows that these five years account for 70 percent of all PFF filings on first-
lien mortgages. We chose to work with the years 2004-2008 because we wanted to compare the PFF
data to the data on originations from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). We chose 2004 as the
first year, because the variables available in the pre-2004 HMDA data were quite limited. At the time of
this writing, the 2009 HMDA data were available to us, but we chose not to work with it because lending
practices changed dramatically after the subprime mortgage crisis crippled the world financial system in
late 2008. Loans originated in 2009 were very different from loans originated in previous years, so – for
this analysis – we wanted to focus on loans originated in the years leading up to and including the crisis.
One avenue for future research is to compare lending patterns in the periods before and after the crisis to
see how those differences affect the rate at which borrowers default.
3.2 MATCHING THE PRE-FORECLOSURE FILING DATA TO THE HMDA ORIGINATIONS DATA
The HMDA originations data contain the FIPS county code and census tract number of each property. This
is a particularly valuable piece of information because census tracts have a small population (between
2,500 and 8,000 people) which is fairly homogeneous in terms of socio-economic characteristics and
living conditions (US Census Bureau, 2000).
So our first step in matching the PFF data to the HMDA data was to identify the census tract of
each property in the PFF dataset from the address. To identify the census tracts, we used Erle’s (2005)
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Table 2: Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Loan Amount
amount ($1000s) no PFF received PFF overall
under 50 4.9% 2.8% 4.8%
50 to 99 16.5% 13.4% 16.3%
100 to 249 36.1% 27.7% 35.4%
250 to 399 25.8% 33.7% 26.4%
400 to 499 8.3% 12.7% 8.6%
500 and up 8.4% 9.7% 8.5%
total 1,544,118 130,722 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 3: Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Applicant Income
income ($1000s) no PFF received PFF overall
under 40 10.9% 9.9% 10.8%
40 to 59 18.0% 15.6% 17.8%
60 to 79 19.2% 18.3% 19.1%
80 to 99 15.8% 17.3% 15.9%
100 to 119 10.9% 12.9% 11.1%
120 to 159 11.9% 14.0% 12.0%
160 to 199 5.0% 5.4% 5.0%
200 and up 8.4% 6.6% 8.2%
total 1,465,078 123,878 1,588,956
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
“Geo-Coder-US-1.00” Perl module in conjunction with the US Census Bureau’s (2007) TIGER/Line Files.
After using Erle’s Perl module to create a database of New York State addresses from the TIGER/Line
Files, we queried the database to obtain the latitudes and longitudes of the property addresses in the PFF
dataset. Once we had the coordinates, we compared them to a database of census tract coordinates that
we generated from the US Census Bureau’s (2005) “Cartographic Boundary Files.”
Using this method, we were able to identify the census tracts for 96 percent5 of the addresses in the
PFF database. To avoid losing the information that the other four percent contain, we identified each of
the census tracts within the property’s five-digit zip code and counted the number of times each census
tract corresponded to that zip code. We then randomly assigned the property to one of those census
tracts (using the number of occurrences as weights).
Once the Census Tracts of each property had been identified and we had purged the duplicates,
matching the pre-foreclosure filing data to the HMDA originations data was fairly simple. We divided
owner-occupied6, first-lien mortgages in the HMDA data and first-lien mortgages in the PFF data into
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buckets by year of origination, census tract and co-applicant status. On average, there were 34 loans in
each HMDA bucket and 3 loans in each PFF bucket, so to figure out which HMDA origination corresponded
to the pre-foreclosure filing, we compared the loan amounts and chose the closest match.
4 WHO DEFAULTS ON THEIR HOME MORTGAGE?
Having identified the defaults in the HMDA data, we could quickly proceed to our most striking finding:
that black and Latino borrowers defaulted at a higher rate than their white and non-Latino counterparts.
But proceeding with such haste would be unjust. First, we must identify the financial characteristics that
are correlated with default. Then we must compare the loan characteristics of minority and non-minority
borrowers. Only after these first two steps have been conducted can we examine the default rates among
black and Latino borrowers in an impartial manner.
4.1 FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Using the combined HMDA-PFF data, we find that one strong predictor of default is the amount borrowed.
As table 2 shows, 56 percent of the borrowers who received a pre-foreclosure filing took loans in excess
of $250,000, whereas only 43 percent of the borrowers who did not default borrowed more than $250,000.
It would be particularly insightful to compare the amounts that borrowers owe to the value of their
homes. Unfortunately, HMDA does not provide the loan-to-value ratio or any information on the down
payment, so we cannot make such a comparison. Nonetheless, if individuals who borrowed less have a
larger equity stake in their homes, then these findings would illustrate the general principle that borrowers
who have a larger equity stake in their home are less likely to default and enter the foreclosure process.
Repaying a mortgage also depends on the ability to pay, of course. But it’s particularly striking to note
that borrowers with income in the $80,000 to $199,999 range received pre-foreclosure filings at a higher
rate than borrowers above and below that range (as shown in table 3). Why borrowers in the $80-200K
income range default at a higher rate than lower-income borrowers is puzzling. The regression models
discussed in section 5 suggest however that borrowers with higher incomes are less likely to receive
a pre-foreclosure filing after controlling for other factors, such as: loan amount, predicted rate spread,
changes in county-level employment and changes in the FHFA home price index.
Another good predictor of default is the interest cost of the loan. Table 4 shows that borrowers who
took “high-cost” loans were more likely to receive a pre-foreclosure filing. When viewed in a risk-premium
context, this finding should not be surprising. Borrowers who are more likely to default will have to com-
pensate the lender for the additional risk by paying a higher interest rate.
However, there is also a risk that the additional cost of the loan will make the borrower more likely to
default and go into foreclosure. In particular, a borrower’s monthly payment is an increasing function of
the interest rate, so a higher interest rate reduces a borrower’s ability to repay the loan.
Lenders do not set interest rates exogenously however. Since a borrower’s income and loan amount
affect his/her probability of default, all else equal one would expect lenders to compensate for the addi-
tional risk by charging a higher interest rate to low-income borrowers and borrowers who take out a larger
loan.
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Table 4: Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Loan Cost
loan cost no PFF received PFF total
non-high cost 92.8% 7.2% 1,364,557
high cost 89.4% 10.6% 310,283
overall 92.2% 7.8% 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 5: High Cost Loans by Applicant Income
income ($1000s) non-high cost high cost overall
under 40 10.1% 13.9% 10.8%
40 to 59 17.8% 18.0% 17.8%
60 to 79 19.0% 19.4% 19.1%
80 to 99 15.6% 16.9% 15.9%
100 to 119 10.8% 12.1% 11.1%
120 to 159 12.1% 11.9% 12.0%
160 to 199 5.3% 4.1% 5.0%
200 and up 9.3% 3.8% 8.2%
total 1,290,774 298,182 1,588,956
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 6: High Cost Loans by Loan Amount
amount ($1000s) non-high cost high cost overall
under 50 4.4% 6.6% 4.8%
50 to 99 15.9% 18.0% 16.3%
100 to 249 37.1% 28.1% 35.4%
250 to 399 25.8% 29.0% 26.4%
400 to 499 8.1% 10.8% 8.6%
500 and up 8.7% 7.6% 8.5%
total 1,364,557 310,283 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
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Table 7: High Cost Loans by Additional Applicant
status non-high cost high cost total
no co-applicant 77.8% 22.2% 952,877
co-applicant 86.3% 13.7% 721,963
overall 81.5% 18.5% 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 8: Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Additional Applicant
status no PFF received PFF total
no co-applicant 91.1% 8.9% 952,877
co-applicant 93.6% 6.4% 721,963
overall 92.2% 7.8% 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
In line with this reasoning, we find that low-income borrowers are more likely to receive a high-cost
loan than borrowers with higher income. Table 5 shows 80 percent of high-cost loans were originated to
borrowers with income below $120,000, whereas only 73 percent of loans that were not high-cost loans
were originated to such borrowers.
Surprisingly however, there does not appear to be any systematic relationship between loan amount
and the likelihood of the loan being a high-cost loan. Table 6 shows that loan amounts below $100,000
were more likely to be high-cost loans and loan amounts in the $250,000 to $499,999 range were also
more likely to be high-cost loans.
It is difficult to understand why small loan amounts (i.e. those under $100,000) were more likely to be
high-cost loans and why large loan amounts (i.e. those over $500,000) were less likely to be high-cost
loans. Regression analysis (which controls for other factors like income) does not even help to explain this
puzzle. As discussed in section 5, borrowers who took out larger loan amounts tended to receive lower
interest rates on their mortgages after controlling for other factors even though the larger loan amounts
made them more likely to default.
Another important factor in explaining interest rates is whether there is a co-borrower on the loan or
not. As table 7 shows, 22 percent of loans without a co-applicant were high-cost loans, whereas only
14 percent of loans with a co-applicant were high-cost loans. This may be attributable to the fact that a
second borrower is a (potential) second source of income, which helps to mitigate the risk that the loan
will go into default. As table 8 shows, 9 percent of loans without a co-borrower received a pre-foreclosure
filing, whereas only 6 percent of loans with a co-borrower received a pre-foreclosure filing.
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Table 9: High Cost Loans by Applicant Race
race non-high cost high cost total
Asian 89.7% 10.3% 89,998
Black/Afr. Am. 64.9% 35.1% 166,380
White 84.2% 15.8% 1,161,960
not provided 76.8% 23.2% 234,393
overall 81.5% 18.5% 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 10: High Cost Loans by Applicant Ethnicity
ethnicity non-high cost high cost total
Hispanic/Latino 71.9% 28.1% 134,937
Not Hispanic/Latino 82.8% 17.2% 1,263,971
not provided 77.5% 22.5% 232,693
overall 81.5% 18.5% 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
4.2 RACE AND ETHNICITY
In section 2, we reviewed evidence of racial and ethnic discrimination in lending practices. The HMDA
data captures one form of such discrimination – the difference in the rate spread between loans originated
to minorities and loans originated to whites. As tables 9 and 10 show, blacks and Latinos received a
disproportionately high share of high-cost loans. Asians, by contrast, received a disproportionately low
share. Tables 11 and 12 show that blacks and Latinos also received a disproportionately high share of
pre-foreclosure filings, so one also has to wonder if racial and ethnic discrimination in lending practices
contributed to the disproportionately high share of defaults among blacks and Latinos.
One way to address this question is to ask if fundamental differences between minorities and non-
minorities justify the difference in rate spreads. If so, then the next question to ask is if those fundamental
differences could have caused blacks and Latinos to default at disproportionately higher rates.
The first fundamental factor that we’ll consider is income. If minority borrowers tended to have lower
income than their non-minority counterparts, then one could justify the difference in rate spreads on the
basis of income. Such a hypothesis only finds partial support in the data. Table 13 shows that 26 percent
of Asian borrowers and 18 percent of white borrowers had income over $140,000, while only 11 percent
of black borrowers did. The distribution of income by ethnicity shows a similar pattern. As table 14 shows,
18 percent of non-Latino borrowers had income over $140,000, while only 14 percent of Latinos did.
At first glance, the fact that there is more weight in the upper region of the income distribution among
non-minority borrowers than there is among minority borrowers appears to lend support to the hypothesis
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Table 11: Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Applicant Race
race no PFF received PFF total
Asian 92.8% 7.2% 89,998
Black/Afr. Am. 88.0% 12.0% 166,380
White 92.8% 7.2% 1,161,960
not provided 91.7% 8.3% 234,393
overall 92.2% 7.8% 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 12: Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Applicant Ethnicity
ethnicity no PFF received PFF total
Hispanic/Latino 89.0% 11.0% 134,937
Not Hispanic/Latino 92.4% 7.6% 1,263,971
not provided 92.0% 8.0% 232,693
overall 92.2% 7.8% 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
that differences in income help explain why blacks and Latinos received a disproportionate share of high-
cost loans. However, the lower region of the income distributions refutes the hypothesis. It appears to
have been easier for low-income whites and non-Latinos to obtain a mortgage. Specifically, 31 percent
of white borrowers had income below $60,000, while only 25 percent of black borrowers did. Similarly,
30 percent of non-Latinos had income below $60,000, while only 19 percent of Latinos did. Consequently,
it would be hard to justify the disproportionate share of high-cost loans that blacks and Latinos received
on the basis of income differentials.
Turning to default rates, the fact that a larger share of black and Latino borrowers fall into the $80-200K
income range (than their white and non-Latino counterparts) provides some support for the hypothesis
that income differences may help explain why blacks and Latinos were more likely to default, but the
default rates among Asians casts doubt on the hypothesis. Specifically, table 13 shows that 50 percent of
black borrowers fell in the $80-200K income range. That’s higher than the 42 percent of white borrowers,
but less than the 58 percent of Asian borrowers. Table 14 shows that 57 percent of Latino borrowers had
income between $80,000 and $199,999 income, but only 43 percent of non-Latinos did.
Given the inability of income to explain the racial and ethnic disparities in loan cost and defaults, we
now consider the amount of the original loan. Differences in loan amounts help explain why blacks and
Latinos received a disproportionate share of pre-foreclosure filings, but they do not necessarily explain
why they received a disproportionate share of high-cost loans.
Specifically, minorities tended to borrow much more than their non-minority counterparts. Table 15
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Table 13: Applicant Income by Applicant Race
income ($1000s) Asian Black/Afr. Am. White not provided overall
under 40 4.0% 8.0% 12.2% 8.7% 10.8%
40 to 59 11.7% 16.5% 18.9% 16.1% 17.8%
60 to 79 16.3% 23.0% 18.7% 19.4% 19.1%
80 to 99 17.3% 20.1% 15.1% 16.0% 15.9%
100 to 119 14.4% 13.6% 10.4% 11.0% 11.1%
120 to 159 17.6% 12.4% 11.5% 12.5% 12.0%
160 to 199 8.3% 3.7% 4.9% 5.5% 5.0%
200 and up 10.5% 2.7% 8.4% 10.8% 8.2%
total 85,965 156,030 1,105,913 220,741 1,588,956
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 14: Applicant Income by Applicant Ethnicity
income ($1000s) Hispanic/Latino Not Hispanic/Latino not provided overall
under 40 5.8% 11.6% 8.9% 10.8%
40 to 59 12.9% 18.5% 16.3% 17.8%
60 to 79 20.6% 18.9% 19.2% 19.1%
80 to 99 21.4% 15.4% 15.8% 15.9%
100 to 119 15.9% 10.6% 10.9% 11.1%
120 to 159 14.8% 11.7% 12.4% 12.0%
160 to 199 4.8% 5.0% 5.5% 5.0%
200 and up 3.8% 8.2% 11.0% 8.2%
total 125,440 1,203,686 219,669 1,588,956
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
suggests that 62 percent of white borrowers borrowed less than $250,000 whereas only 40 percent of
blacks did. Interestingly however, Asians appear to have borrowed even more than blacks (only 34 per-
cent borrowed less than $250,000), but had the lowest rate of high-cost loans. Turning to ethnicity, table 16
shows that 59 percent of non-Latinos borrowed less than $250,000, whereas 36 percent of Latinos bor-
rowed less than that amount.
The finding that blacks and Latinos tended to borrow more helps explain why they received a dispro-
portionately high share of pre-foreclosure filings, but it does not explain why they took high-cost loans at
a higher rate than their white, Asian and non-Latino counterparts. Asians also borrowed more, but took
fewer high-cost loans. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the regression analysis in section 5 also re-
futes the hypothesis that borrowers who took out larger loan amounts would receive lower interest rates.
The opposite is true. All else equal, the rate spreads on larger loans tend to be lower.
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Table 15: Loan Amount by Applicant Race
amount ($1000s) Asian Black/Afr. Am. White not provided overall
under 50 1.0% 3.2% 5.7% 2.7% 4.8%
50 to 99 6.3% 8.4% 19.1% 12.1% 16.3%
100 to 249 26.3% 28.3% 37.2% 35.2% 35.4%
250 to 399 33.3% 40.5% 23.0% 29.9% 26.4%
400 to 499 18.0% 12.8% 7.1% 9.4% 8.6%
500 and up 15.1% 6.8% 7.8% 10.7% 8.5%
total 89,998 166,380 1,161,960 234,393 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 16: Loan Amount by Applicant Ethnicity
amount ($1000s) Hispanic/Latino Not Hispanic/Latino not provided overall
under 50 2.1% 5.4% 2.9% 4.8%
50 to 99 7.1% 17.8% 12.7% 16.3%
100 to 249 26.4% 36.1% 35.6% 35.4%
250 to 399 41.7% 24.4% 29.0% 26.4%
400 to 499 13.6% 8.1% 9.0% 8.6%
500 and up 9.2% 8.1% 10.7% 8.5%
total 134,937 1,263,971 232,693 1,674,840
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
In summary, neither income nor loan amount appear to justify the higher rate spreads on loans orig-
inated to blacks and Latinos. This finding is particularly disturbing because borrowers who took out
high-cost loans were more likely to default, but the finding is not evidence of discrimination because the
HMDA data does not contain critical information, such as the credit score and loan-to-value ratio.
5 ECONOMETRIC MODELS OF RATE SPREADS AND DEFAULTS
Section 4 describes several questions raised by the combined HMDA-PFF dataset. The most striking
questions are why blacks and Latinos were more likely to take high-cost loans and why they are more
likely to default on their mortgages. But there were other questions too. One is why there isn’t a clear
relationship between the amount of the original loan and the whether the loan was a high-cost loan.
Another was why borrowers in the $80-200K income range default at a higher rate than borrowers with
income both above and below that range.
In an attempt to answer some of these questions, this section presents a basic regression analysis.
Although we have not developed a formal theory from microeconomic foundations, the analysis below
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presents an intuitive reduced form model. We acknowledge that our model may contain omitted-variable
bias if race and ethnicity are correlated with credit score or loan-to-value ratio, but the bias is unlikely to
be so severe that it invalidates all of the findings of the studies discussed in our literature review. We
attempt to mitigate some of the omitted-variable bias in the model of default probability by including the
log difference in the FHFA Home Price Index and the log difference in county-level employment between
the year that the loan was originated and the year 2010.
Furthermore, the reader should notice that our Tobit model of a borrower’s rate spread is a reduced
form model of the price at which a lender and a borrower agree to originate a loan. While lenders charge
a higher interest rate to borrowers at greater risk of default, the higher interest rate also makes the loan
more difficult to repay. Therefore, our predicted rate spread from the first stage serves as an instrument
in the second stage model of a borrower’s probability of defaulting on his/her home mortgage.
The limitations of the HMDA data prevent us from testing more sophisticated models of the implicit
supply and demand decisions and the estimates presented in this article suffer from omitted-variable bias.
Nonetheless, if the signs of the regression coefficients are correct, then the model does provide us with
insight into the causes of mortgage default.
5.1 ECONOMETRIC METHODS
One problem confronting any econometric analysis of the HMDA data is how to work with the rate spread.
The HMDA data only provide a value of the rate spread when the difference between the interest rate on
the mortgage and the yield on the comparable U.S. Treasury exceeds three percentage points7. Conse-
quently, when addressing the question of why black and Latino borrowers were more likely to take out a
high-cost loan, we have to find a way to work with the rate spread.
The simplest method is to reduce the rate spread to a binary variable (i.e. one if high-cost, zero
otherwise) and employ a probit or logit model to estimate the probability that a borrower took a high-cost
loan. The trouble with such a strategy is that is discards valuable information on the magnitude of the
differences in rate spread among borrowers.
The alternative is to employ a Tobit model to obtain an estimate of the rate spread itself. The trouble
with this strategy is that 81 percent of the loans in the combined HMDA-PFF dataset are not high-cost
loans, so no value of the rate spread is reported for these loans. Therefore, instead of using the Tobit
model to estimate the tail of the distribution, the Tobit model has to estimate 81 percent of the distribution.
We chose to use the Tobit model however because it provides an estimate of the rate spread which
can be used as an instrument in a second-stage regression on the probability of defaulting on the home
mortgage. One must use an instrument for the rate spread in the second-stage to overcome the endo-
geneity problem that arises when lenders charge higher interest rates to borrowers who are more likely to
default.
To obtain efficient estimates of the parameters in the second-stage probability model, we used an
algorithm that Adkins (2009) developed to implement Amemiya’s Generalized Least Squares (AGLS).
Adkins (2008) shows that the AGLS estimator yields consistent estimates of the parameters’ standard
errors and can be used to test the statistical significance of the parameters.
The AGLS algorithm requires estimates of the residuals from the first-stage regression, but – because
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the rate spread is censored at three percentage points – we could not use response residuals as we
would if the first-stage regression were a standard OLS regression model. Therneau and Lumley’s (2009)
“survival” package for R (R Development Core Team, 2010) provides a viable alternative however. As its
“survreg” function iteratively maximizes the log-likelihood function, it predicts the value of the dependent
variable and calculates a correction term, called the “working residual” (Therneau, 1999), which we use
in place of the response residual.
5.2 DISCUSSION OF THE REGRESSION RESULTS
As shown in table 17, the rate spreads on owner-occupied, first-lien mortgages originated to blacks
and Latinos were higher than those originated to their white and non-Latino counterparts and the differ-
ences were statistically significant, even after controlling for other variables such as income, loan amount,
whether there was a co-borrower on the loan, the purpose of the loan and region of the state and year of
origination.
As emphasized repeatedly throughout this article, the estimated coefficients suffer from omitted-
variable bias, but the racial and ethnic disparities in interest rates are too large to ignore. The coefficient
estimates in model 1 suggest that the interest rate on a loan originated to a black borrower was 1.36
percentage points higher than a the interest rate originated to an equivalent white borrower. Model 2 sug-
gests a slightly smaller difference: 0.86 percentage points. Turning to Latinos, the coefficient estimates in
model 1 suggest that Latinos paid 0.92 percentage points more than an equivalent non-Latino borrower,
while model 2 puts the gap at 0.64 percentage points. While this is deeply disturbing, the HMDA data
omits many important variables (such as the borrower’s credit score and the loan-to-value ratio), so we
cannot conclude that this is evidence of discrimination.
With one exception, the signs of the other coefficients in the model are not surprising. The coefficient
on loan amount is the exception. It seems odd to us that borrowers who took out larger loans would pay a
lower interest rate. In the case of the HMDA data however, a large loan amount may be acting as a proxy
for variables that we do not observe and thus indicate that the borrower is more creditworthy.
Before accepting our findings at face value however, one must note an important limitation of using the
Tobit model to predict the rate spread: the estimates are far from perfect. By adding the average yield on
a 30-year U.S. Treasury to the predicted rate spread, we can compare the Tobit models’ predicted interest
rates to the ones in the pre-foreclosure filing data. As tables 18, 19 and 20 show, the predicted interest
rates do not have as much weight in the upper region as the interest rates in the PFF dataset. We believe
that the predicted rate spread is correlated with the unobserved true values of the rate spread, but there
is no way to check the validity of our model.
Turning to the second-stage model of the probability that a borrower will default, we find that the
coefficient on the predicted rate spread is positive (suggesting that borrowers with higher rate spreads
were more likely to default), but is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level in model 1 and is not
statistically significant at all in model 2.
Both models suggest that black race and Latino ethnicity are positively correlated with the probability of
default after controlling for other factors, such as income, loan amount and whether there is a co-applicant
on the loan. We do not believe however that the melanin level in a person’s skin affects his probability of
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Table 17: Two-Stage: Tobit predicts Rate Spread, then Probit predicts PFF
Model 1 Model 2
Tobit probit Tobit probit
Intercept −0.0513 *** −2.1133 *** 0.0037 −2.1071 ***
(0.0004) (0.1183) (0.0054) (0.1715)
Pred. Rate Spread 0.4093 . 0.3302
(0.2434) (0.3173)
ln(Loan Amount) −0.0005 *** 0.2511 *** −0.0005 *** 0.2486 ***
(0.0001) (0.0252) (0.0001) (0.0366)
ln(App. Income) −0.0014 *** −0.2067 *** −0.0009 *** −0.2054 ***
(0.0001) (0.0251) (0.0001) (0.0365)
Co-Applicant −0.0053 *** −0.1044 *** −0.0049 *** −0.1059 **
(0.0001) (0.0243) (0.0001) (0.0352)
Conv’l Loan 0.0156 *** 0.0158 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Home Purchase 0.0114 *** 0.0112 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Home Improve. 0.0075 *** 0.0073 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Hispanic/Latino 0.0092 *** 0.1705 *** 0.0064 *** 0.1702 **
(0.0001) (0.0424) (0.0001) (0.0616)
Asian −0.0017 *** −0.0447 −0.0034 *** −0.0456
(0.0002) (0.0510) (0.0002) (0.0742)
Black/Afr. Am. 0.0136 *** 0.2381 *** 0.0086 *** 0.2396 ***
(0.0001) (0.0395) (0.0001) (0.0575)
Race not provided 0.0060 *** 0.0662 * 0.0047 *** 0.0640
(0.0001) (0.0334) (0.0001) (0.0485)
Female 0.0019 *** −0.0174 0.0018 *** −0.0180
(0.0001) (0.0249) (0.0001) (0.0363)
∆ ln(County Emp.) −1.8524 ** −1.9836 *
(0.5722) (0.8206)
∆ ln(House Price Idx.) −0.3514 . −0.3530
(0.1844) (0.2678)
Minority Pop. Pct. 0.0001 ***
(0.0000)
ln(HUD Median −0.0059 ***
Family Income) (0.0005)
AIC −561,338 827,003 −572,134 826,728
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.010, * p < 0.050, . p < 0.100
Standard errors in parenthesis. Models also contain geographic, year and purchaser-type dummies.
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
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Table 18: Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Predicted Interest Rate (Tobit Model #1)
interest rate no PFF received PFF overall
under 4.000 18.9% 13.2% 18.4%
4.000 to 5.999 49.2% 47.0% 49.0%
6.000 to 7.999 26.0% 30.4% 26.4%
8.000 to 9.999 5.8% 9.1% 6.0%
10.000 to 11.999 0.1% 0.3% 0.1%
total 1,435,566 122,402 1,557,968
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 19: Pre-Foreclosure Filings by Predicted Interest Rate (Tobit Model #2)
interest rate no PFF received PFF overall
under 4.000 19.4% 13.7% 19.0%
4.000 to 5.999 48.4% 45.6% 48.2%
6.000 to 7.999 26.0% 30.9% 26.4%
8.000 to 9.999 6.0% 9.6% 6.3%
10.000 to 11.999 0.1% 0.3% 0.2%
total 1,435,566 122,402 1,557,968
Data: Combined HMDA-PFF
Table 20: Distribution of Interest Rates in Pre-Foreclosure Filing Data
interest rate total percent
under 4.000 11,133 6.0%
4.000 to 5.999 49,876 26.8%
6.000 to 7.999 94,870 50.9%
8.000 to 9.999 21,643 11.6%
10.000 to 11.999 7,060 3.8%
12.000 to 13.999 1,430 0.8%
14.000 and up 354 0.2%
total 186,366 100.0%
Data: Full PFF
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default. Instead we believe that black race and Latino ethnicity are acting as a proxy for some missing
variable that does increase their probability of default, such as differences in socio-economic status, racial
and ethnic disparities in the impact of the recent economic recession and/or forms of discrimination that
we cannot measure with the HMDA data.
As one would expect, the coefficient on applicant income was negative and statistically significant
in both models. We could have used a quadratic term in the regression model to reproduce the result
in table 3 (where we found that borrowers in the $80-200K income range were more likely to default),
but given the possibility that income is correlated with some of the other explanatory variables, we were
reluctant to over-fit the model. Testing a quadratic term is left to future research.
It’s interesting to note that the coefficient on the percentage change in the home price index is only
statistically significant at the 10 percent level in model 1 and is not statistically significant at all in model 2.
By contrast, the coefficient on the percentage change in county-level employment is statistically significant
at the 5 percent level in both models. Importantly, the effect of changes in county-level employment is
large. Labor market recovery would sharply reduce the rate of mortgage default in New York State.
6 CONCLUSION
After a year of collecting data, the NYSBD had collected enough data to support this analysis, to begin
studying the causes of mortgage default and foreclosure and to begin studying the role that racial and
ethnic disparities played in causing the foreclosure crisis.
Importantly, this analysis also suggests that employment growth may have the strongest effect on
the home mortgage default rate. In the absence of employment growth, even large principal balance
reductions would only have a minimal effect on the rate of mortgage default. The coefficient estimates
in section 5 imply that, for a borrower with a 20 percent probability of default, having taken out a loan
10 percent smaller (i.e. the equivalent of a 10 percent principal balance reduction) would only reduce the
default probability to 19.3 percent. Regardless of how downward-biased our coefficient estimate might
be, it seems clear that the large losses that principal balance reductions would impose on lenders would
not be outweighed by lower default rates. There are no easy solutions.
Because mortgage servicers found themselves too understaffed to handle the wave of defaults (State
Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, 2008) and because the foreclosure crisis has had a disproportion-
ate impact on minority communities, Neiman’s (2008) report concluded that lenders, servicers, counselors
and governments must work together to identify deliquent borrowers, assign to them counselors who will
help them achieve the best possible outcome given the circumstances. That enforced cooperation took
the form of the pre-foreclosure filing project, which supplied the data for this analysis.
In his 2011 “State of the State” address, newly-inaugurated New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo assigned
blame for the foreclosure crisis on both “Washington” and “Albany.” Cuomo then proposed a merger of
the state banking and insurance departments, which was enacted and became effective on Oct. 3, 2011.
Since Cuomo’s speech, neither the NYSBD nor its successor, the DFS, have issued a single report on the
pre-foreclosure filing project. Nor has the pre-foreclosure filing project generated any policy response.
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NOTES
1Both authors of this paper are former employees of the NYSBD. One of us wrote code for the PFF
database, worked with the mortgage servicers who filed the notices, took calls from foreclosure lawyers
and, on occasion, took calls from terrified homeowners. As heads of the NYSBD’s research unit, we sup-
ported the department’s regulatory oversight of the home mortgage market by providing regular analysis
of the HMDA data to the department’s executive team. Neither the NYSBD nor its successor, the DFS,
have compensated us for conducting this analysis or for writing this article. We wanted to write it because
we believe that it is important to understand the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis and how it has
disproportionately affected minority communities.
2New York Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo’s 2011 budget abolished the state banking and insurance depart-
ments and merged their functions into the Department of Financial Services on Oct. 3, 2011.
3Rugh and Massey use the term “subprime” to describe high-cost loans.
4In the rare cases where the servicer did not include a loan number, we used the property address
instead of the loan number.
5238,830 of the 248,556 (non-unique) addresses
6Mortgage servicers only file pre-foreclosure filing notices when the property is a primary residence,
so when matching the PFF data to the HMDA data, we focus on mortgages originated for owner-occupied
properties.
7More precisely, the HMDA data provide a value for the rate spread of a first-lien mortgage when it
exceeds three percentage points. For other lien statuses, the HMDA data provides a value for the rate
spread when it exceeds five percentage points. Our analysis focuses exclusively on first-lien mortgages.
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